Populism(s) in the V4 and the floating meaning of the ‘people’

Central-Eastern Europe is often described as the cradle of illiberal democracy in the European Union. Over the past years, an academic consensus has emerged pointing to ‘democratic backsliding’ in the region. This hasty judgment, however, does not take into consideration the different trajectories these relatively new democracies have followed (Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley, 2018). To make this picture even more incomplete, there is the tendency to equate ‘illiberalism’ and ‘populism’ as faces of the same phenomenon. Seongcheol Kim’s book is a much-needed work to overcome simplifications of the ‘illiberal backlash’ as it offers an in-depth study of the diverse shapes populism has assumed in the region beyond the equivalence between populism and illiberalism. The book aims to enhance clarity in the comprehension of the political scene in the Visegrád Four (V4: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) by focusing on the construction of the ‘people’. The result is a nuanced differentiation of populisms that sheds light on the political trajectories of these countries in the last 30 years and the relation (if any) between populism and illiberalism (most visible in the authoritarian hegemonic projects discussed in the final chapter of the book). Rather than a monolithic populist contestation of the post-1989 order, the picture that emerges from the analysis is a complex one where the empty signifier ‘people’ comes to embody different worldviews and different hegemonic formations.

The book is firmly grounded within post-foundational discourse theory and it is inspired theoretically and methodologically by Ernesto Laclau’s work on populism (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). This approach is particularly suitable “for digging deeper into the meanings of populist discourses as well as their discursive contexts of emergence” (p.4). Accordingly, not only does the book contribute to understanding what the ‘people’ means in the Visegrád context; it also explains populism against the background of the post-1989 imaginary. Deconstruction of the ‘peoples’ (in the plural) and its conditions of possibility (as an alternative imaginary against the post-1989 broken promises) are the two main novelties of the book. In addition, using Laclau’s specific vocabulary, Kim’s empirical analysis offers a methodical and practical application of post-foundational methodology (unfortunately still rare in Discourse Theory).

Based on these premises, populism is seen as a political logic of articulation that combines the signifier ‘people’ with a range of different elements from different political traditions. The resulting ‘chain of equivalence’ creates an antagonistic frontier against a ‘power bloc’ and defines the nature of a certain populism: from centrist populism (e.g. Public Affairs in the Czech Republic) to nationalist populism (e.g. Jobbik in Hungary); from anti-party populism (e.g. Kukiz ’15 in Poland) to conservative populism (e.g. OLaNO in Slovakia). This ‘populism with adjectives’ leads to an interesting (and maybe unintentional) outcome: notwithstanding the explicit post-foundational perspective, the author manages to bridge the gap between Laclau’s political logic to Cas Mudde’s populist thin ideology. The several categorizations of populism (from liberal to nativist) resemble the thickening of populism with external ideologies. The result is an analysis of the populist political logic based on Laclau’s ontology that is ontically reflected in Mudde’s ideational approach.

This is evident in the chapters dedicated to the empirical analysis of populist parties in the V4 from 1989 up to today (3 to 6, a chapter for each country). The very structure of the chapters makes clear their aim and scope: understanding the role of the ‘people’ in political discourses. Moving from a historical account of the ‘people’ as a construction used for nation-building, this term has assumed a counter-hegemonic role after the regime change in 1989. A standard analysis of a populist party starts from the contextualization of their political activity, it moves to the construction of the people (e.g. ‘citizens’, ‘ordinary people’, ‘family’…), analyzes other elements that ‘thicken’ populism through discursive articulations, and continue the discussion about the evolution of the political party and its discourse. In most of the cases (and this is one of the contributions of the book) populist discourses contest the broken promises of the post-1989 imaginary: “a common feature of many of the populist discourses analyzed here is that they radically reshuffle the discursive terrain of what it means to be a society after 1989/90” (p.270). It is the dissatisfaction with the post-1989 order that sparks what Jan Zielonka and Jacques Rupnik (2020) have defined as counter-revolutions.

As in the typical populist literature, populist discourses in the V4 contest the ‘elite’; the ‘power’ that blocks people’s identity. While significant (if not all) attention is given by Kim to the ‘people’, the role of the ‘enemy’ is somewhat overlooked. The analysis is indeed populism-driven: rather than moving from a particular problem in each country (namely, the rise of populist or illiberal parties), the author is interested in identifying when the populist logic is articulated by political parties. This research process is in line with the goal and scope of the book. However, it raises a question: does the construction of the ‘enemy’ impact the populist discourse itself? The author seems to be aware of the diverse nature of the ‘elite’. An interesting differentiation in the conclusions of the book separates generational counter-hegemonic populism and authoritarian hegemonic projects as the two most significant forms of populisms in these countries (p.271), especially in their current shape (the so-called third generation after 2010). In the former, the enemy is associated with ‘old parties’ or ‘political dinosaurs’ as the hegemonic formation in power to be challenged. The latter, instead, is represented by two important populist parties in power: Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland “draw on populism as part of projects of establishing authoritarian hegemony” (p.279). These parties and their discourses do not only contest the political party system; they also offer a completely different picture of the post-1989 imaginary and concretely aim at redefining what society means. In the words of Viktor Orbán (2014), “the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state”. They reject the post-1989 trajectory towards a certain liberalism to redefine the meaning of society, to hegemonize it. Should we then use the same populist lens to discuss generational counter-hegemonic populism and authoritarian hegemonic projects?

To answer this question, I would dwell on the concept of hegemony. The book presents a non-Gramscian approach to the concept of hegemony (significantly, Gramsci is never mentioned). In this context, hegemony often indicates party hegemony. In the generational counter-hegemonic populism, the enemy is often constructed as the old political party system. In this case, this type of populist parties applies the populist logic more as a political strategy than as a contestation of the political order. It is counter-hegemonic to the extent that they seek to break the party hegemony of the traditional parties. It is, therefore, closer to a sort of qualunquismo (common’s man politics), praising the common man against the corrupt elite: in the words of Andrej Babis, “it’s better to run the state like a family firm” (p.88); anyone would be able to do that. Conversely, if we understand hegemony as those sites of power that exert both political and intellectual control over civil society (Gramsci, 1971), Fidesz and PiS are truly counter-hegemonic. They contest liberal hegemony, namely the idea that became commonsensical after 1989 that society needs to be liberal. To be sure, the separation between generational counter-hegemonic populism and authoritarian hegemony reflects this discussion. However, references to qualunquismo and Gramscian hegemony would enhance the significance and depth of this distinction.

To conclude, the book is a valid contribution to the populist literature on Central-Eastern Europe: on the one hand, the deep analysis of populism(s) in the V4 is enlightening for those that seek to understand the nature of populist parties in these countries and their context of emergence. On the other hand, the book contributes to populist literature by empirically showing the different meanings the signifier ‘people’ can assume and how the populist logic of articulation works in practice.

References

Cianetti, L., Dawson, J. & Hanley, S. (2018) Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland. East European Politics 34(3), 243-256.

Gramsci A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.

Orbán, V. (2014). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp. 26 July 2014, Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad), Romania. Available online at: https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp

Zielonka, J. & Rupnik, J. (2020). From Revolution to ‘Counter- Revolution’: Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 30 Years On. Europe-Asia Studies 72(6), 1073-1099.